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Regulation for the Smart
Grid Could Upset the
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and State Jurisdiction in
Electricity Regulation
Cynthia Anderson

I. INTRODUCTION

It is a truism to say that electricity is integral to modern life, from the
basic uses of providing light and heating to the more modern economic necessity of the Internet. A widespread or long-term electric
grid failure would devastate the United States.1 Despite continually
growing reliance, significant efforts to upgrade the grid and take advantage of new technologies with the potential to transform grid
efficiency and reliability have only been underway for about the last
decade.2 In the United States, there is a coordinated effort between the
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Robert Miller, Hurricane Katrina: Communications & Infrastructure Impacts, in THREATS
OUR THRESHOLD: HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY IN THE NEW
CENTURY 191, 191 (Bert B. Tussing ed., 2006), http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/
default/files/071022_ThreatsAtOurThreshold.pdf (describing the collapse of critical
infrastructure, including the electrical grid, as “catastrophic”).
2 The main legislation directing resources towards the Smart Grid was enacted in
December 2007. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140
1
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federal and state governments and the private sector to implement
these technologies, creating what is referred to as the Smart Grid.3
Despite a general agreement between the government, private industry, and academics to pursue the Smart Grid’s implementation,
basic arguments about how the technologies should be implemented,
and whether the U.S. regulatory environment should be restructured,
as a result, are still largely unresolved.4 Under the current framework,
each state retains regulatory authority over most aspects of electricity
generation and all aspects of distribution, leaving a fairly limited role
for the federal government.5 Inherent in the design of the Smart Grid,
however, is an increased interconnectedness that makes differing regulatory standards all the more likely to have a significant impact on
broader grid reliability and interstate commerce.6 This potential for
grid-wide impact is nowhere more clear-cut than in relation to
cybersecurity standards.7

(2007). The organization at “the forefront of research into the feasibility of the smart
grid on a large scale” was established in 2008. EarthTalk, How Upgrading the Power Grid
Will Save Energy and Money, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Apr. 6, 2009),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/upgrading-power-grid/# (discussing the
Future Renewable Electric Energy Delivery and Management Systems Center and its
work with “universities, industry and national laboratories” to develop smart
technologies).
3 See Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2013) (indicating that both federal and state governments have begun to build
“[c]omprehensive policy frameworks”).
4 See discussion infra Part III (explaining competing views over regulatory structure of
the Smart Grid).
5 See discussion infra Section II.B (discussing traditional jurisdictional lines related to
electricity regulation).
6 See discussion infra Section II.C.ii.a (detailing concerns about the potential impact of
the Smart Grid structure on the security of the electric grid).
7 As this article went to press, information was released by the United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (“US-CERT”) that underscored the potential for a
cybersecurity breach of the U.S. electric grid, and the need to ensure even the most
remote portions of the grid are made secure. US-CERT revealed in an Alert released
March 15, 2018, that the Russian Government had “targeted small commercial facilities’
networks where they staged malware, conducted spear phishing, and gained remote
access into energy sector networks. See Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting
Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors, TA18-074A (Mar. 15, 2018),
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A. Although the information was
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State governments and many local utilities argue that implementing the Smart Grid should not have any effect on the jurisdictional
balance between the states and the federal government.8 While this is
largely accepted in relation to rate-setting and utility-siting, many
academics argue that federal jurisdiction should be expanded when
setting cybersecurity standards to protect against potential
vulnerabilities caused by differing standards.9

II. BACKGROUND

A. Overview of the Electrical Grid
Structure
In the United States, the electrical grid is separated into two regional
interconnections and three intrastate grids.10 The Eastern Interconnection is comprised of all of the states east of the Rockies, and portions
of Canada.11 The Western Interconnection is comprised of all of the
contiguous states west of the Rockies, and portions of Canada and

recently publicized, the Russian government has been targeting U.S. critical
infrastructure since at least March 2016. Id.
8 See Eisen, supra note 3, at 51 (saying that “[s]tates are virtually unwilling to cede any
authority to [the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]” when it comes to regulating
the Smart Grid).
9 See discussion infra Section II.B (citing academic articles arguing that federal regulation
is necessary).
10 See Learn More About Interconnections, OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY DELIVERY & ENERGY
RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policycoordination-and-implementation/transmission-planning/recovery-act-0 (last visited
Apr. 10, 2018) [hereinafter Learn More] (describing the Eastern and Western
Interconnections and recognizing Alaska and most of Texas as having discrete grids);
William Pentland, What is at Stake for Hawaii in NextEra Energy – HECO Merger, FORBES
(Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2015/01/30/what-is-atstake-for-hawaii-in-nextera-energy-heco-merger/ (recognizing that Hawaii, Alaska,
and Texas are run separate from the regional grids due, in the case of the former two,
to physical isolation).
11 See Learn More, supra note 9 (recognizing that most of Texas is excluded from the
Eastern Interconnection).
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Mexico.12 Because the regional interconnections involve the interstate
transmission of electricity, federal jurisdiction to regulate is
implicated in certain parts of the process, as described below.13
There are three distinct components to the electrical grid for regulatory purposes—generation, transmission, and distribution.14
Electricity generation occurs at individual, intrastate plants utilizing a
variety of methods, including coal-burning, nuclear reaction, and
solar conversion.15 Generated electricity is routed through highpower, intrastate voltage lines for transmission to meet usage needs
across the entire interconnection.16 While bulk electricity sales do
occur directly among providers along the high-voltage transmission
lines, final distribution to end consumers such as businesses and individual homes is facilitated by local utility companies.17 Despite the
integrated ability to transmit power generated in one state to an end
user in another, providers have had limited visibility into issues along
the grid.18 Representative of this limited visibility is the fact that
“utilit[ies] often only know[] where an outage is located when [they]
receive[] a customer's phone call.”19

Id. Note, although the Eastern and Western Interconnections both extend beyond the
boundaries of the United States, that does not change anything discussed below
regarding jurisdictional authority.
13 See discussion infra Section I.B (describing the existing federal and state jurisdictional
boundaries). Note that because their grids are contained wholly within the borders of
one state, Hawaii, Alaska, and the majority of Texas are not subject to federal
jurisdiction and are thus outside of the scope of this paper. See Pentland, supra note 9.
14 See, e.g., New York v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2002) [hereinafter
New York v. FERC] (recognizing generation, transmission, and distribution as
fundamental aspects of providing electricity and that Congress drew jurisdictional lines
along those three categories in the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) of 1935).
15 Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Grid Governance: The Role of a National Network Coordinator, 35
CARDOZO L. REV. 1993, 2001 (2014).
16 See id. (explaining that transmission networks have been increasingly interconnected
to increase grid reliability and defray costs of expensive new power plants through coownership).
17 See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 10–11 (recognizing that transmission lines are
integral to the bulk power market but that sales to retail customers occur through stateregulated utility companies).
18 See Eisen, supra note 3, at 8 (noting a general failure to use sensors and other
technology for monitoring).
19 Id.
12
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B. Federal and State Jurisdictional Lines
in Electricity Regulation
Federal jurisdiction over the electrical grid is derived from Congress’s
constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce.20 Regulatory
authority is, therefore, divided between the state and federal governments based on whether the function of an action or regulated entity
is intrastate or interstate in nature. Jurisdictional boundaries have
essentially followed those established by Congress under the Federal
Power Act of 1935 (“FPA”).21
The FPA provides for federal jurisdiction over the transmission
and wholesale sale of electric energy in interstate commerce.22 It
specifically exempts from federal jurisdiction any facilities used in
electricity generation, local distribution, and intrastate transmission.23
Thus, of the three components of the electrical grid, only transactions
associated with high-voltage interstate transmission lines fall under
the general jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”).
Although FERC only has general authority to regulate interstate
transmission and wholesale sales, it does have limited jurisdiction
over electricity generation facilities. The Energy Policy Act of 2005
amended the FPA to extend federal jurisdiction over “generation facilities needed to maintain transmission system reliability” for purposes
of mandatory grid reliability standards affecting interstate transmission and the bulk-power system.24 Accordingly, the federal government has some form of regulatory authority over two of the three
components of the electrical grid.

See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 5–6 (explaining that the Federal Power Act of
1935 was enacted to provide for federal regulation over aspects of the electrical grid
that states could not regulate under the Commerce Clause).
21 See Christopher Bosch, Note, Securing the Smart Grid: Protecting National Security and
Privacy Through Mandatory, Enforceable Interoperability Standards, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1349, 1398 (2014) (noting that the FPA provided the original statutory basis for federal
regulation of the electric grid, though the scope of allowed regulation has grown over
time due to increased interconnectedness of the grid).
22 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2014).
23 Id. § 824(b)(1).
24 Id. § 824o(a)(1)(B); see also id. at § 824o(b) (defining commission jurisdiction).
20
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Though there is no explicit statutory authority for federal regulation of distribution-level public utilities, some voluntary actions by
the utilities can bring them under FERC jurisdiction for rate-setting
purposes. In New York v. FERC,25 the Supreme Court reviewed FERC
Order No. 888, which, inter alia, required application of a single tariff
for all utilities purchasing transmission services whenever retail utilities voluntarily unbundled generation and transmission pricing.26
New York argued that FERC had exceeded the boundaries of its jurisdiction in attempting to regulate unbundled retail transmission prices
because all retail transactions were “properly the subject of state
regulation.”27 The Supreme Court rejected New York’s argument,
however, and concluded that FERC did have jurisdiction to regulate
the unbundled retail transmission of electricity because it had jurisdiction over any transmission in interstate commerce and “the nature
of the national grid” results in all electricity transmission being
aggregated on the same transmission lines.28
C. The Smart Grid
The Smart Grid is a coordinated effort across the electricity industry
to create “robust communication paths between end-use consumers .
. . and upstream to the utilities, or other energy service providers.”29
There are five categories of Smart Grid systems being implemented30:

New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1.
Id. at 11.
27 Id. at 16.
28 Id. at 17. See id. at 7, 17, 20 (reviewing the structure of the electrical grid and concluding
that transmission was inherently interstate in nature and therefore properly subject to
federal regulation, regardless of whether the end purchaser was wholesale or retail).
29 Ray Gifford & Eric Gunning, Telecommunications & Electronic Media: The Opportunity
and Peril of Smart Grid, 11 ENGAGE 128 (2010).
30
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-117, ELECTRICITY GRID
MODERNIZATION: PROGRESS BEING MADE ON CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINES, BUT KEY
CHALLENGES REMAIN TO BE ADDRESSED 7 tbl.1 (2011) [hereinafter “GAO Report”]
(explaining the Smart Grid system categories described by the National Energy
Technology Laboratory (“NETL”)).
25
26
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(1) Integrated communications;31 (2) advanced components;32 (3)
advanced control methods;33 (4) sensing and measurement;34 and (5)
improved interfaces and decision support.35 The U.S. Department of
Energy lists the following anticipated benefits of the Smart Grid
technologies include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

More efficient transmission of electricity
Quicker restoration of electricity after power disturbances
Reduced operations and management costs for utilities, and
ultimately lower power costs for consumers
Reduced peak demand, which will also help lower electricity
rates
Increased integration of large-scale renewable energy systems
Better integration of customer-owner power generation systems,
including renewable energy systems
Improved security36

Integrated communication systems are “[h]igh-speed, fully integrated, two-way
communications technologies” that allow for “real-time information and power
exchange.” Id. These technologies are implemented along the distribution channels or
in consumer homes. Id.
32 Advanced component systems utilize the latest technologies to “produce higher
power densities, greater reliability and power quality . . . and improved real-time
diagnostics.” Id. Examples include enhanced use of storage devices, “smart appliances”
in consumer homes and businesses, and local “microgrids” that can operate
independently from the larger grid when necessary. Id.
33 Advanced control methods systems “monitor power system components” to
“improve utilization of generation and transmission assets” by, for instance, using
sensors along substation and distribution facilities to automatically identify system
failures. Id. at 8.
34 Sensing and measurement systems provide information about equipment
functionality and consumer demand to utility companies and inform consumers about
current prices and demand. Id. This is accomplished through use of “smart meters,”
sensors, “[c]onsumer portals,” and “[d]ynamic line-rating devices.” Id.
35 Improved interface and decision support systems utilize software to analyze system
data and enable utility employees to make “more accurate and timely” decisions. Id.
36 OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, What
is the Smart Grid?, SMARTGRID.GOV, https://www.smartgrid.gov/the_smart_grid/smart
_grid.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2018).
31
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i. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
While efforts were initiated by private industry, both federal and state
legislators have taken steps to promote the initiative.37 The primary
federal statute regulating Smart Grid progress is the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (“EISA”).38 EISA lays out ten goals
for the Smart Grid that, together, are intended to “maintain a reliable
and secure electricity infrastructure that can meet future demand
growth . . . .”39 Additionally, it provides direction for the creation of a
uniform framework of interoperability standards that will ensure all
components of the Smart Grid can interact effectively and securely.40
In doing so, it provides for some additional federal jurisdiction over
the electricity industry.41
EISA assigns the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(“NIST”) primary responsibility for coordinating the development of
a framework of interoperability standards for the Smart Grid.42 It requires NIST to solicit input from other federal committees, including
the Smart Grid Task Force and the Smart Grid Advisory Committee,43
as well as state agencies and private industry.44 The NIST standards

See GAO Report, supra note 29, at 4 (acknowledging that electricity industry made
initial steps towards updating the grid to take advantage of new technologies); Eisen,
supra note 3, at 6 (indicating that both federal and state governments have begun to
build “[c]omprehensive policy frameworks”).
38 See Eisen, supra note 3, at 5 (explaining that Congress enacted EISA to prescribe the
Smart Grid standards-setting process).
39 42 U.S.C. § 17381 (2014). EISA’s ten listed goals for the Smart Grid system inform the
work conducted by the NETL and the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(“NIST”) as described supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text.
40 42 U.S.C. § 17385(a)–(b) (2012).
41 See discussion infra Section II.C.i (describing EISA-based federal jurisdiction).
42 42 U.S.C. § 17385(a).
43 Id. § 17383(a)(1). The Smart Grid Task Force and Smart Grid Advisory Committee
were established under EISA to act in an advisory capacity to relevant federal agency
heads by being involved in federal, state, and private Smart Grid initiatives. See Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 § 1303 (2007).
44 42 U.S.C. § 17385(a)(1)–(2).
37
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are required to be “flexible, uniform and technology neutral.”45 However, state and industry adoption of the NIST standards is strictly
voluntary.46
Under EISA, FERC is provided with jurisdiction to adopt NIST
interoperability standards as mandatory through rulemaking proceedings where there is “sufficient consensus” regarding the standard, and it is “necessary to insure smart-grid functionality and
interoperability in interstate transmission of electric power, and
regional and wholesale electricity markets.”47 FERC has interpreted
the language to mean that it has authorization to conduct rulemaking
proceedings affecting distribution-level facilities, if necessary.48 However, it is generally accepted that because EISA does not provide FERC
with any additional enforcement authority, the standards will only be
mandatory where they fall within FERC’s other grants of
jurisdictional authority under the FPA, as amended.49
ii. Cybersecurity Concerns
a. Identified Potential Vulnerabilities
In a 2011 report, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) identified a number of potential vulnerabilities in the Smart Grid system.50
The vulnerabilities included a larger number of potential entry points
into the electrical grid by hackers as a result of increased integration

Id. § 17385(b).
See Bosch, supra note 20, at 1380–81 (explaining that NIST standards can only become
mandatory if adopted through a FERC rulemaking proceeding in compliance with EISA
requirements).
47 42 U.S.C. § 17385(d).
48 See GAO Report, supra note 29, at 13 n.12.
49 Compare GAO Report, supra note 29, at 18–19 (explaining that FERC would have the
ability to enforce standards, in conjunction with the North American Electric
Corporation, under its grid-reliability authorities and through incentive-based
programs), with Eisen, supra note 3, at 37 (noting that FERC enforcement power is
limited to “its existing FPA authorities to regulate interstate transmission of
electricity”).
50 These vulnerabilities are reflected in the introductory “What GAO Found” section of
the GAO Report. See GAO Report, supra note 29.
45
46

51

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

of grid components and newly implemented systems; unknown vulnerabilities inherent with new system and network technologies; the
ability for hackers to affect a larger area of the grid at one time through
interconnecting systems; and increased incentives to hack the system
for monetary gain because of the potentially large amount of customer
information stored within the system.51 It is generally acknowledged
that a single attack has the potential to cause region-wide electrical
grid failures that could last for days at a time.52 Such an occurrence
could have an almost unimaginable economic and human impact,
especially if a cyber-attack were coordinated with a physical terrorist
attack.53 As one commentator notes, the negative consequences of a
widespread power outage are exacerbated by the interdependent nature of the nation’s critical infrastructure systems, such as water and
transportation, with the electrical grid.54
b. Attacks That Have Already Occurred
The GAO vaguely references a variety of cybersecurity issues that
have already occurred or been proven to be a threat, in the United
States and abroad.55 Cybersecurity experts have shown that vulnerabilities in smart meters have the potential to allow a hacker to disrupt
the electricity grid,56 and the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) has
Id. at 9 (listing categories of risk involving physical infrastructure).
E.g., Zhen Zhang, Cybersecurity Policy for the Electricity Sector: The First Step to
Protecting our Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Threats, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 319, 326–
27 (2013) (discussing the means by which an attack may have wide reaching regional
consequences).
53 Cf. Miller, supra note 1 (describing the collapse of critical infrastructure, including the
electrical grid, as “catastrophic”).
54 See Michael McElfresh, Can the Smart Grid Survive a Cyberattack?, ENERGY POST (June
29, 2015), http://www.energypost.eu/can-smart-grid-survive-cyberattack/ (quoting a
report that called the electrical grid an obvious target for those seeking to do physical,
economic and psychological harm to the nation).
55 See GAO Report, supra note 29. The summary “What GAO Found” section
acknowledges that the report was not able to adequately address the risk of attacks,
despite the GAO’s intention to do so.
56 See Eduard Kovacs, Smart Meters Pose Security Risks to Consumers, Utilities: Researcher,
SECURITY WEEK (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.securityweek.com/smart-meters-posesecurity-risks-consumers-utilities-researcher (explaining that hackers could hijack
network traffic-connecting smart appliances and the grid and take control of devices).
51
52
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already reported regional overseas power disruption as a result of
“malicious activities against IT systems[.]”57 The cited materials referencing the CIA-acknowledged attacks are no longer accessible, but
there are still media reports available online. Though the media
reports do not include specifics, one attack apparently resulted in a
multi-city power failure, while others resulted in extortion demands.58
The Stuxnet computer worm is also cited as an example of a significant cybersecurity concern for the U.S. electrical grid, though that
attack was not carried out against an electrical grid.59

III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
EXTENDING FEDERAL
JURISDICTION

The arguments are fairly predictable for why or why not to extend
federal jurisdiction over the electrical grid for cybersecurity standardsetting purposes. State regulators want to maintain the existing jurisdictional boundaries, which would keep federal involvement limited
to aspects involving interstate transmission and wholesale sales.60
Many academics argue, however, that it is necessary for federal jurisdiction to extend over the entire electrical grid for cybersecurity
standard-setting purposes, to ensure consistency and compliance.61
Each of these arguments contains additional nuance, explored further
below.
Researchers have said that the security vulnerabilities have persisted, despite initial
studies showing their existence in 2010. Id.
57 See GAO Report, supra note 29, at 10.
58 Tom Espiner, CIA: Cyberattack Caused Multiple-City Blackout, CNET NEWS (Jan. 22,
2008), https://www.cnet.com/news/cia-cyberattack-caused-multiple-city-blackout/.
59 See McElfresh, supra note 53 (explaining how the systems used to operate the Smart
Grid are substantially similar to those that were compromised by the Stuxnet computer
worm, which shut down Iranian centrifuges used for uranium enrichment); Doug
Drinkwater, Stuxnet-style Attack on US Smart Grid Could Cost Government $1 Trillion, SC
MAGAZINE (July 13, 2015), http://www.scmagazineuk.com/stuxnet-style-attack-on-ussmart-grid-could-cost-government-1-trillion/article/426108/ (discussing a report that
detailed why the U.S. electrical grid could be vulnerable to a Stuxnet-style attack).
60 E.g., Gifford & Gunning, supra note 28, at 130.
61 See Bosch, supra note 20, at 1391–94 (explaining that voluntary or limited standards
are insufficient because of the high stakes involved if a failure does occur).
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A. Arguments for Maintaining Existing
Jurisdictional Boundaries
There are essentially two categories of arguments for maintaining
existing jurisdictional boundaries between state and federal governments for purposes of Smart Grid cybersecurity regulation: first, that
the federal government only has enforcement authority over interstate transmission, and any further standards could only be enforced
by influencing the states; and second, that there are practical concerns
with mandating standards at a federal level.
It is noted that, even if FERC could mandate standards for all
portions of the grid and all participants, “it [is] not clear how it would
enforce a mandate.”62 Some argue that FERC “can only mandate
standards for interstate transmission” and that it has no “authority
over generation, middle-mile and last-mile distribution, or in-home
energy management.”63 This traditional breakdown should continue
to be seen in the jurisdictional boundaries for physical Smart Grid investments.64 Thus, an attempt by the federal government to change its
jurisdiction over Smart Grid cybersecurity could be seen by states as
“an attempt to usurp some of the state powers with respect to the prudence of grid investments, interoperability mandates, and grid
management.”65 Rather, it is necessary for federal agencies to convince
states to enact the standards proposed by NIST in order to avoid legal
challenges to federal jurisdictional authority.66
There are numerous practical concerns about a change in jurisdictional boundaries relating to cybersecurity of the Smart Grid.
Specifically, the concerns relate to the potential negative effects of

Eisen, supra note 3, at 51.
Gifford & Gunning, supra note 28, at 129.
64 See id. at 130 (discussing the juxtaposition between federal jurisdiction asserted over
all cybersecurity of the smart grid with the retained traditional jurisdictional
boundaries for physical infrastructure investment approvals).
65 Id.
66 See Resolution, Nat’l Ass’n of Reg. Util. Commissioners, Resolution Regarding Smart
Grid (July 22, 2009), https://pubs.naruc.org/pub.cfm?id=53985C5D-2354-D714-51F0F9226449 C37D (emphasizing the need for the federal government to partner with the
state regulatory authorities in creating policies and standards for the Smart Grid and
emphasizing jurisdictional lines for FERC and the state governments).
62
63
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mandatory regulation.67 For instance, private-sector commentators
noted that it prefers voluntary standards because they are more flexible and less likely to be set arbitrarily or to remain in place despite
becoming obsolete.68 State governments and electricity providers
expressed concern that any mandatory rules, even if limited to areas
of traditional jurisdiction, would “gain traction and work their way
down to the local level.”69 Thus, in effect, any federal rules would become the standard across all levels and undermine state authority to
regulate.70
B. Arguments for Extending Federal Jurisdiction to
Include Cybersecurity of all Aspects of the Smart
Grid
Even proponents of extending FERC’s jurisdiction do not assert that
its enforcement authority was affected by EISA.71 Rather, the arguments rest on the fact that FERC and the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) can, in fact, promulgate rules under
those acts—enforcement concerns aside—and that mandatory rules
are simply necessary.72 One reason why mandatory standards across
the entire grid are necessary is that a grid failure would have such
devastating consequences.73 For instance, the aggregate impact of

See Eisen, supra note 3, at 51 (identifying mandatory regulations as one of the greatest
concerns for Smart Grid commentators).
68 See id. at 51–52. (expressing concerns about mandatory FERC requirements and
potential monopolization of the energy sector).
69 Id. at 51.
70 Cf. ROGER LEVY ET AL., SMART GRID STANDARDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS; BACKGROUND AND FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 13
(Nov. 2010), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/naruc-nist111010.pdf (noting the
potential for federal agency adoption to create jurisdictional issues while asserting that
adoption of mandatory standards by some states could impact operations in other states
in the interconnection).
71 See Bosch, supra note 20, at 1392–93 (noting that EISA was unclear about how FERC
would enforce the standards it allowed FERC to promulgate via rulemaking, but that
FERC did not interpret its enforcement authorities to have been modified by the
statute).
72 See id. at 1393 (listing industry concerns resulting from a lacking standard).
73 See id. at 1394 (emphasizing electricity’s significant role in daily lives); see also supra
notes 41–47 and accompanying text.
67
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“smart grid home device[s]” on the bulk power grid could result in
wide-spread reliability or security issues across an interconnection.74
In addition, proponents argue that, rather than being negative for the
industry by risking stagnant standards, a uniform approach would
benefit stakeholders by providing certainty that investments into
security and infrastructure will comply with requirements and thus
industry stakeholders will not “risk losing their entire investment if
future laws invalidate their approach.”75

IV. CONCLUSION

Cybersecurity of the Smart Grid presents a unique problem regarding
decades-old and long-settled jurisdictional boundaries in the area of
electricity regulation. Because vulnerabilities at a single point on the
Smart Grid could result in power failure on an interstate or regional
scale, the concept of local distribution of power does not apply as
directly as it would in traditional transactions. Though Congress has
passed a law that does provide FERC with authority to promulgate
rules-setting standards for cybersecurity of the Smart Grid, there remains controversy over whether, and to what extent, federal
jurisdiction has been or should be broadened.
Industry commentators argue that mandatory rules set by the federal government will often be behind the curve on what is technologically possible and will be left in place long after becoming obsolete.
Thus, the Smart Grid would inherently have unnecessary
vulnerabilities that would be addressed by using the most up-to-date
knowledge and technologies. On the other hand, proponents of expanding federal jurisdiction point out that whenever standards are
not mandatory, some actors will always fail to implement necessary

North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Comment of the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation in Response to the Commission’s March 19, 2009
Proposed
Smart
Grid
Policy
Statement
11
(May
11,
2009),
http://www.nerc.com/files/NERCSmartGridPolicy StatementComments.pdf.
75 See Bosch, supra note 20, at 1396–97 (quoting BOB LOCKHART & BOB GOHN, PIKE
RESEARCH, UTILITY CYBER SECURITY: SEVEN KEY SMART GRID SECURITY TRENDS TO
WATCH IN 2012 AND BEYOND 5 (2011)) (describing how uncertainty about standards at
early stages is likely preventing investment and innovation).
74
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safeguards. Because of the interconnected nature of the Smart Grid,
any single vulnerability would have far-reaching consequences. Thus,
a uniform approach would benefit stakeholders by providing clear
guidance that supports investment in costly infrastructure and
technology upgrades.
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